David and Rosemary Olsen; Dianne and William Newland; Rick Margolis, Plaintiffs/Appellants, vs. Park City Municipal Corporation, a Municipal Corporation; Valley of Love LLC, a Utah Limited Liability Company, Defendants/Appellees. by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School 
BYU Law Digital Commons 
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) 
2015 
David and Rosemary Olsen; Dianne and William Newland; Rick 
Margolis, Plaintiffs/Appellants, vs. Park City Municipal 
Corporation, a Municipal Corporation; Valley of Love LLC, a Utah 
Limited Liability Company, Defendants/Appellees. 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law 
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah. 
Recommended Citation 
Brief of Appellee, Olsen, Newland &a v Park City Municip, No. 20141196 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2015). 
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/3198 
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital 
Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/
utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with 
questions or feedback. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DA YID and ROSEMARY OLSEN; 
DIANNE and WILLIAM NEWLAND; 
RICK MARGOLIS, 
Plaintiffs/ Appel ]ants, 
vs. 
PARK CITY MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATION, a Utah municipal 
corporation, and VALLEY OF LOVE, LLC, 
a Utah Limited Liability Company, 
Defendants/ Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
VALLEY OF LOVE, LLC 
Case No. 20141193-CA 
District Case No. 110500786 
Appeal from the Final Order and Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court, Summit 
County, State of Utah, Honorable Todd M. Shaughnessy 
Eric P. Lee (4870) 
Justin J. Keys (13774) 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK 
& MCDONOUGH, PC 
1441 West Ute Boulevard, Suite 330 
Park City, Utah 84098 
Telephone: (435) 655-3071 
Attorneys/or Valley of Love, LLC 
Mark Hanington (6562) 
Polly Samuels McLean (8922) 
Park City Municipal Corporation 
P.O. Box 1480 
Park City, Utah 84060 
Attorneys f or Park City Municipal Corp. 
Bruce R. Baird (0176) 
BRUCE R. BAIRD, P.C. 
2150 S. 1300 E. 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 328-1400 
Attorney for David and Rosemary Olsen, 
Diane and William Newland, and Rick 
Margolis 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURJ~ 
~LATE COURTS 
AUG 2 8 2015 
AUG 28 2D15 

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DAVID and ROSEMARY OLSEN; 




PARK CITY MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATION, a Utah municipal 
corporation, and VALLEY OF LOVE, LLC, 
® a Utah Limited Liability Company, 
Defendants/ Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
VALLEY OF LOVE, LLC 
Case No. 20141193-CA 
District Case No. 110500786 
Appeal from the Final Order and Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court, Summit 
County, State of Utah, Honorable Todd M. Shaughnessy 
Eric P. Lee (4870) 
Justin J. Keys (13774) 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK 
& MCDONOUGH, PC 
1441 West Ute Boulevard, Suite 330 
Park City, Utah 84098 
Telephone: ( 435) 655-3071 
Attorneys for Valley of Love, LLC 
Mark Harrington (6562) 
Polly Samuels McLean (8922) 
Park City Municipal Corporation 
P.O. Box 1480 
~ Park City, Utah 84060 
Attorneys for Park City Municipal C01p. 
Bruce R. Baird (0176) 
BRUCE R. BAIRD, P.C. 
2150 S. 1300 E. 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 328-1400 
Attorney for David and Rosemary Olsen, 
Diane and William Newland, and Rick 
Margolis 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF JURJSDICTION ................................................................................... l 
Ci> STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW ................................... I 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................................ I 
STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................................................. 2 
@ SUMM.ARY OF ARGUMENT ........................................................................................... 4 
ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................................... 5 
I. PLAINTIFFS ARE COLLATERALLY ESTOPPED FROM 
RAISING ARGUMENTS ADDRESSED BY THE DISTRICT 
COURT IN THE CUP ACTION .................................................................. 5 
II. THE ORDINANCE DOES NOT VIOLATE A LAW, STATUTE, 
OR ORDINANCE IN EFFECT AT THE TIME THE DECISION 
WASMADE ................................................................................................. 9 
A. The Ordinance does not abrogate or annul any restrictions 
in violation ofLMC § 15-7-S(B)(l) .................................................. 9 
B. The Ordinance does not violate the several purpose 
statements of LMC § 15-7-2 ............................................................ 10 
C. The Ordinance does not violate the General Plan ............................ 13 
III. PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO ADDRESS THE PREJUDICE 
PRONG BELOW AND CANNOT REMEDY THAT FAIL URE 
\\/ITH NEW ARGUMENTS RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME 
ON APPEAL ............................................................................................... 15 
CONCijUSl ON .................................................................................................................. 17 
II 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Federal Cases 
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 
533 U.S. 606 (2001) .................................................................................................... 10 
State Cases 
Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 
2003 UT 16, 70 P.3d 47 ................................................................................................ 5 
Carrier v. Salt Lake Cnty., 
2004 UT 98, 104 P.3d 1208 .......................................................................................... 1 
Fox v. Park City, 
2008 UT 85,200 P.3d 182 ...................................................................................... 1, 12 
Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City, 
2000 UT App 31,997 P.2d 321 .................................................................................... 5 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 
923 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1996) ........................................................................................... 6 
Macris & Assocs. Inc. v. Neways Inc., 
2000 UT 93, 16 P.3d 1214 ............................................................................................ 5 
Springville Citizens for a Better C,nty. v. City of Springville, 
I 999 UT 25, 979 P.2d 332 ...................................................................................... 5, 15 
State v. Holgate, 
2000 UT 74, 10 P.3d 346 ............................................................................................ 15 
Suarez v. Grand Cnty., 
2012 UT 72, 2 96 P. 3 d 6 8 8.......................................................................................... 15 
Warne v. TYarne, 
2012 UT 13, 2 7 5 I). 3 d 23 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 
Tf1inward v. State, 
2 0 12 UT 8 5, 2 9 3 P. 3 d 2 5 9 . .. . .. .. . .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. . . . .. .. . . .. . .. . . . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . . . .. .. .. . . .. .. .. . .. . .. .. .. .. 16 
State Statutes 
Utah Code§ 10-9a-801(3)(a)(ii) (2007) ............................................................................ 1 
Utah Code § 10-9a-80 I (3 )( d) ............................................................................................. 1 
Utah Code § 78A-3-102(3)(j) ............................................................................................... I 
Utah Code§ 78A-3-102(4) ................................................................................................. I 
Utah Code § 78A-4- l 03(2)0) .............................................................................................. 1 
111 
OilierAuilioriti~ 
LMC § 15-2.16-2 ............................................................................................................... 11 
LMC § 15-7-1 .................................................................................................................... 13 
LMC § 15-7-2 ............................................................................................................. passim 
LMC § 15-7-S(B) ............................................................................................................. 6, 9 
Park City Ordinance No. 10-08 ................................................................................... passim 
® 
IV 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction over this matter under Utah Code Sections 78A-3-
102(3)U), 78A-3-102(4), and 78A-4-103(2)U). On January 8, 2015, the Utah Supreme 
Court entered an order transferring this case to the Utah Court of Appeals. (R. 310-311 ). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Did the trial court correctly conclude that the adoption of Ordinance No. 10-
08 was not illegal? 
Standard of Review: The court of appeals affords no deference to a district court's 
review of an order of a local land use authority. 1 "Like the review of the district court, [the 
Court's] review is limited to whether a land use authority's decision is 'arbitrary, capricious, 
or illegal. "'2 
A land use authority's decision is illegal if it "violates a law, statute, or 
ordinance in effect at the time the decision was made." Because a 
determination of illegality is based on the land use authority's interpretation 
of zoning ordinances, [the Court] review[s] such determinations for 
correctness, but ... "also afford[s] some level of non-binding deference to 
the interpretation advanced by" the land use authority.3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appe11ants David and Rosemary Olsen, Dianne and \Villiam Newland, and llick 
Margolis (the "Plaintiffs") chaJienge the adoption of Park City Ordinance No. I 0-08 (the 
"Ordinance"), ,vhich converted three metes and bounds parcels into one platted lot of 
1 See Fox v. Park City, 2008 UT 85, ~ 11, 200 P.3d 182. 
2 Id. (quoting Utah Code § 10-9a-801 (3)(a)(ii) (2007)). 
3 Jd. (quoting Utah Code§ 10-9a-801(3)(d); Carrier v. Salt Lake Cn(y., 2004 UT 98, 




record. Plaintiffs argue that the Ordinance is illegal because it increases the buildable area 
on the combined parcels. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment on the 
legality of the Ordinance. 
The district court granted Defendant/Appellee Valley of Love, LLC ("Valley of 
Love") and Park City Municipal Corporation's (the "City") motions for summary judgment. 
i) In so doing, the court concluded that (1) "the material facts are not in dispute;" 
@ 
(2) Plaintiffs' challenge of the Ordinance as arbitrary or capricious fails; and (3) "[t]o the 
extent [the Neighbors] challenge the ordinance as illegal, the challenge also fails."4 These 
conclusions were based on the court's detennination that "[t]he adoption of Ordinance 
No. I 0-08 did not violate Park City's Land Management Code, Park City's General Plan, or 
any other law, statute, or ordinance in effect at the time it was adopted."5 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Valley of Love owns three parcels ofland on Empire Avenue in Park City, Utah. 
The three parcels of land all border one another.6 The two smaller parcels border Empire 
Avenue, ,vith the larger parcel landlocked behind the smaller parcels.7 Due to setback 
requirements, the smaller t\vo parcels are unbuildab]c.8 Because the larger parcel does not 
4 R. 300-01. 
5Jd.at301. 
6 See R. l 53. 
7 Id. 
s R. 145. 
2 
border a public street, it is not buildable without an easement over one of the smaller 
parcels.9 
In 2009, Valley of Love applied (through the City's minor subdivision process) for 
the three parcels to be combined as a single plotted lot of record-a requirement for Valley 
of Love to receive a building permit. The Park City Planning Commission reviewed Valley 
of Love's application and forwarded it on to the City Council with a recommendation that 
the application be granted. The City Council held a public hearing on the application and, 
after detennining that the proposed subdivision complied with Park City's Land 
Management Code ("LMC'), approved the subdivision by passing the Ordinance. 
Valley of Love also applied for a conditional use pem1it ("CUP") to construct low-
income housing on the platted lot. 10 Plaintiffs opposed the application, voicing their 
opposition to the low-income housing project to the Park City Planning Commission and 
City Council. Eventually the Planning Commission recommended-and the City Council 
approved-Valley of Love's CUP application. 
Plaintiffs appealed the lot subdivision and the CUP approval to the district court. 
The district court granted summary judgment for the City and Va1ley of Love in both 
cases. 11 Plaintiffs chose not to appeal the CUP order and the deadline to appeal that 
decision lrns Jong passed. 
9 R. 165. 
IOR. 161-163. 
11 See May 13, 2013 Ruling and Order, David Olsen v. Park City A1unicipal Corp., Case 
No. 110500209, Judge Todd Shaughnessy; R. 300-02. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This is one of two legal actions that Plaintiffs initiated in an attempt to prevent 
Valley of Love from building low-income housing on the property at issue. In the other 
action-the CUP action-Plaintiffs disputed the legality of the CUP proceedings by raising 
the same arguments. Because the district court reached a final judgment on the merits in the 
CUP action, Plaintiffs are collaterally estopped from re-hashing those issues in this appeal. 
If the Court is persuaded that Plaintiffs are not collaterally estopped from re-raising 
these issues, the district court's ruling should nevertheless be affirmed because Plaintiffs' 
@ arguments fail on the merits. The Ordinance combined three separate metes and bounds 
parcels into a single lot of record. That simple action did not violate any provision of the 
LMC or Park City's General Plan. 
Even if Plaintiffs could demonstrate that the Ordinance was illegal, their claims fail 
because they did not establish below that they were prejudiced by any such illegality. The 
Court should reject Plaintiffs' attempt for the first time on appeal to demonstrate prejudice. 
Plaintiffs did not preserve this argument before the district court and should not be allO\ved 




Plaintiffs appeal the legality of a zoning ordinance-a municipal land use decision 
that is "generally entitled to a 'great deal of deference. "'12 Zoning decisions are presumed 
valid 13 and "will not [be] interfere with ... except in the most extreme cases. "14 Under this 
deferential approach, it is 'the court's duty to resolve all doubts in favor' of the 
municipality, and the burden is on the plaintiff challenging a municipal land use decision to 
show that the municipal action was clearly beyond the city's power."15 
Plaintiffs cannot meet this burden because ( 1) they are collaterally estopped from 
bringing the very arguments they raise on appeal, (2) the Ordinance does not violate a law, 
statute, or ordinance in effect at the time it was passed, and (3) they failed to establish 
prejudice. 
I. PLAINTIFFS ARE COLLATERALLY ESTOPPED FROM RAISING 
ARGUMENTS ADDRESSED BY THE DISTRICT COURT IN THE CUP 
ACTION. 
Parties and their privies are collaterally estopped from relitigating facts and issues 
that were fully addressed in a prior suit. 16 A party is estopped from relitigating an issue 
(1) that is "identical in the previous action and in the case at hand, (2) that ,vas "decided in a 
final judgment on the merits in the previous action," (3) that ,vas "competently, fully, and 
12 Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 2003 UT 16, ~ 10, 70 P.3d 47 (quoting Springville 
Citizens for a Better Cm(v. v. City of Springville, 1999 UT 25, il 23, 979 P.2d 332). 
13 Harmon City, inc. v. Draper City, 2000 UT App 31, ii 7, 997 P.2d 32 l. 
14 Bradley~ 2003 UT' 16, ~ 24. 
15 Id. ,1 12. 
16 Afacris & Assocs. Inc. v. Neways inc., 2000 UT 93, ~ 19, l 6 P .3d 1214. 
5 
fairly litigated in the previous action," and ( 4) where "the party against whom collateral 
estoppel is invoked ... [was] either a party or privy to a party in the previous action. "17 
Here, each of these requirements is met. 
First, the issues are identical. Plaintiffs argue that the Ordinance violates LMC § 15-
7-S(B )( 1) because "the intended effect of the Ordinance was to increase the buildable square 
@ footage ... on the aggregated lot."18 Plaintiffs relied on the same code section, LMC § 15-
7-S(B), to make the identical argument in the CUP case. There, the argument was phrased 
this way: "the Property [can] not gain greater density or development rights than the sum 
afforded to each of the separate parcels prior to their combination."19 
Plaintiffs also argue that the Ordinance violates 1:wo of the purpose statements of 
LMC § 15-7-2, namely to "prevent overcrowding of the land and undue congestion of 
population" and "to provide the most beneficial relationship benveen the uses of land and 
buildings and circulation of traffic throughout the municipality, having particular regard to 
<i> the avoidance of congestion in the streets and highways."20 These arguments mirror those 
in the CUP case, where Plaintiffs argued that "the consolidation of the three lots ... [and] 
the CUP violates Section l 5-7-2(C) of the LMC by creating additional congestion ... [ and] 
by increasing congestion on streets and highways," and that a finding "that lot 
17 Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & A1cDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366~ 1370 (Utah 1996). 
18 Brief of Appellants, at 8. 
19 Plaintiffs' Combined Reply~ Case No. 110500209 (Mar. 4, 2013), at 5. 
20 Brief of Appellants, at 10. 
6 
consolidations should provide the most beneficial relationship between uses of land and 
building and circulation of traffic" was not made.21 
Plaintiffs also presented their General Plan arguments in the CUP case. Plaintiffs 
argue here that the subdivision and proposed construction violates the General Plan 
because it is inconsistent with the General Plan's requirement that the property east of 
Empire Avenue "provide skier bed base transitioning in scale to Park Avenue ... ,''22 and 
because "it grants the Applicant the right to develop the property literally to the 
maximum scale allowed in the RC zone."23 Plaintiffs made both arguments to the district 
court in the CUP case, arguing that "[t]he high density of the Project does not transition 
into lower density area from the Resort as required by the 'Resort Base' designation of 
the property in the General Plan," and "[t]he Project does not comply with the General 
Plan because it is east of Empire A venue and therefore designated as 'Low Density 
Residential. '"24 
Each of these issues ,:vas decided on the merits by the district court in the CUP 
case. On May 10, 2013, the district court issued a Ruling and Order granting summary 
judgment for Valley of Love and the City on these very claims. 25 The district court 
addressed Plaintiff~' arguments under the LMC provisions cited above and held that 
21 Plaintiffs' :Motion for Summary Judgment, Case No. 110500209 (Jan. 2013), at 11-12. 
22 Brief of Appellants, at 14 ( emphasis in original). 
23 Jd. 
24 Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Case No. 110500209 (Jan.2013), at 15-16. 
2s See David Olsen v. Park City A1unicipal Corp., Case No. 110500209 (May I 0, 2013 
Ruling and Order, at 3-4) (referred to hereinafter as the "CUP Order"). 
7 
"Plaintiffs do not connect their aggregation theory to any of these ordinances, and do not 
demonstrate that Park City's decision to grant the CUP violates any of them."26 The 
district court also found "a number of problems" with Plaintiffs' General Plan argument, 
including the fact that the zoning map on which Plaintiffs rely in the General Plan "is for 
'illustrative purposes only,"' and that "serious doubts" existed as to "whether a General 
@ Plan, or a zoning map contained in a General Plan, rises to the level of a 'law, statute, or 
ordinance' upon which a finding of illegality could be made."27 The district court 
ultimately found that "plaintiffs' general plan arguments ... fail as a matter of law."28 
These issues were fairly and competently litigated in the CUP proceedings.29 
Valley of Love and the City objected to the propriety of considering at least one of the 
issues in the context of the CUP proceeding,30 but in the end, all of these issues were 
litigated and a final judgment entered. Plaintiffs were parties to the CUP action and 
involved in the litigation of these issues. Importantly, although they were aware of the 
26 Id. at 4. 
27 Id. at 5. 
2s Id. at 6. 
29 See Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Case No. 110500209 (Jan. 2013 ), at 9-
12; Pls.' Combined Reply, Case No. 110500209 (1\1ar. 4, 2013), at 5-6; Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Case No. 110500209 (Jan. 2013), at 15-16; Plaintiffs' 
Combined Reply, Case No. 110500209 (1\1ar. 4, 2013), at 7-8; Defendants' Joint Motion 
in Opposition of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Case No. 110500209 (Feb. 1, 
2013 ), at 14-18; Defendants' Reply .Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Cross 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Case No. 110500209 (March 28, 2013 ), at 6-7. 
30 Defendants' Joint Motion in Opposition of Plaintiffs' lvlotion for Summary Judgment, 
Case No. 110500209 (Feb. 1, 2013), at 14~ Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support 
of Defendants' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, Case No. 110500209 (March 28, 
2013),at.8. 
8 
court's holdings in the CUP Order, Plaintiffs chose not to appeal. The deadline to appeal 
the CUP Order has long passed, and this Court should reject Plaintiffs' belated attempt to 
pursue these claims on appeal. 
II. THE ORDINANCE DOES NOT VIOLATE A LAW, STATUTE, OR 
ORDINANCE IN EFFECT AT THE TIME THE DECISION WAS MADE. 
A. The Ordinance does not abrogate or annul any restrictions in violation 
of LMC § 15-7-S(B)(l). 
Plaintiffs argue that the Ordinance violates section 15-7-S(B)(l) of the Park City 
LMC. That section states in relevant part: 
These regulations are not intended to interfere with, abrogate, or annul any 
other ordinance, rule or regulation, statute, or other provision of law. 
Where any provision of these regulations imposes restriction different from 
those imposed by any other provision of these regulations or any other 
ordinance, rule or regulation, or other provision of law, whichever 
provisions are more restrictive or impose higher standards shall control.31 
According to Plaintiffs, the density increase that results from combining the parcels into a 
single lot interferes with, abrogates, or annuls the density restrictions placed on the parcels 
when separate. 
LMC § 15-7-5(B )(I) is the general conflict provision of Chapter 7. On its face, that 
provision does not preclude the subdivision of separate parcels into a single lot of record. 
Plaintiffs do not explain hmv the density increase conflicts ,vith § 15-7-S(B)(l ), except to 
suggest that the Ordinance, in a1Jm;ving a three-parcel combination ,vith 12,882 square feet 
of development, somchmv "annuls" the original restrictions on the parcels that limited them 
31 LMC § 15-7-(B)(l ). 
9 
to a total of 8,985 square feet (8,985 for the first parcel, and O for the second and third). But 
the restrictions are in no way annulled. 
The setback restrictions preclude development of parcels below a certain size, but it 
does not follow that those restrictions would also prohibit combining those parcels in order 
to meet the criteria for development.32 The only reason the restriction prohibits 
~ development of the smaller parcels is because they are not large enough to allow for both 
development and setback. But when combined with the larger parcel, the resulting lot is 
large enough to allow both development and setback, so the restriction's requirements are 
met. The LMC does not prohibit this type of subdivision. 
B. The Ordinance does not violate the several purpose statements of LMC 
§ 15-7-2. 
Plaintiffs next argue that the Ordinance violates the purpose statements identified in 
LMC § 15-7-2. Specifically, Plaintiffs focus on LMC § l 5-7-2(C) and (G), which state in 
relevant part: "The purpose of the Subdivision regulations is ... to prevent overcrowding of 
the land and undue congestion of population .... [and] [t]o provide the most beneficial 
relationship between the Uses of land and Buildings and the circulation of traffic, 
throughout the municipality, having particular regard to the avoidance of congestion in the 
32 Indeed, were the restriction interpreted to prohibit landmvncrs from combining srnal1, 
contiguous, otherwise undevelopable parcels, thus mandating they remain eternally open 
space and "dcn[ying] all economically beneficial or productive use of the land," this 
would likely constitute a regulatory taking, and the city ,vould be required to provide just 
compensation to the landowners. See Palazzolo v. Rhode ls/and, 533 U.S. 606, 617 
(200 I). It is unlikely the City intended this result in drafting the LMC. 
10 
Streets and highways .... " These two broad and generalized guiding purposes in the LMC 
do not render the Ordinance illegal. 
Plaintiffs would have the Court view these purposes in a vacuum, without taking into 
consideration the zone-specific LMC provisions or the remaining purpose statements. The 
zone in which Valley of Love's parcels of property are located explicitly allows for "multi-
unit dwellings."33 Many of the neighboring properties, including properties east of Empire 
Avenue, are multi-unit dwellings.34 These multi-unit dwellings do not violate the purposes 
cited by Plaintiffs because they are appropriate for the zone in which they are located. It 
makes sense to increase the density of buildings around the resort base. Doing so, while 
still obeying the density requirements for the area, provides for the most beneficial use of 
such an important area of the city without overcrowding the land and congesting the 
population. 
Plaintiffs' arguments under LMC § l 5-7-2(C) and (G) also miss the mark because 
they are based on considerations that are inapplicable to the subdivision proceeding. For 
example, Plaintiffs discuss at length perceived parking problems that result from the specific 
building that ,vas approved through the CUP process.35 But the type of building to be built, 
number of bedrooms it would contain, and the number of parking spots to be provided, 
,vcre not considerations before the City Council in the minor subdivision application. 
33 LMC § 15-2. 16-2. 
3-1 R. 155-56. 
35 Appellants' BrieJ: at 11-13. 
11 
@ 
Plaintiffs' counsel recognized as much during those proceedings.36 These are 
considerations applicable to the determination of whether to approve the CUP application, 
not whether to combine three parcels into a single lot of record. The cites Plaintiffs provide 
in support of this argument show as much, as they are directed to discussions and reports on 
the CUP applications.37 
Even if the Ordinance violated either of the two cited purposes, this does not mean 
the Ordinance is illegal. Plaintiffs have the burden of showing the Ordinance "violates a 
law, statute, or ordinance."38 The provisions Plaintiffs cite, however, are merely purposes 
behind the LMC subdivision regulations; they are not themselves regulations. These 
provisions of general applicability are incredibly broad; the purposes of "prevent[ing] 
overcrowding" and "provid[ing] the most beneficial relationship)' could be used to strike 
nearly any subdivision. And if applied as advocated by Plaintiffs, they are necessarily 
internally consistent. For example, another purpose of the regulations is "to encourage the 
orderly and beneficial Development of all parts of the municipality."39 'T'he only way in 
,:vhich the two smaller parcels in this subdivision can ever be developed is to combine them 
via subdivision with a larger parcel, and this stated purpose seems to encourage such 
development. Surely a development that provides affordable housing in a City dependent 
on a robust service industry "protect[ s] and provide[s] for the ... genera] welfare of Park 
36 See R. 121. 
37 See Brief of Appel lc1nts, at 11--13 ( citing R. 155-86). 
3& Fox, 2008 UT 85, ii 11. 
39 LMC § 15-7-2(D). 
12 
City," in keeping with yet another purpose behind the subdivision regulations.40 These 
purposes are not laws, statutes, or ordinances, upon which a finding of illegality can be 
made, but rather broad, guiding principles to be used in interpreting specific regulations in 
theLMC. 
C. The Ordinance does not violate the General Plan. 
Plaintiffs argue that the Ordinance is somehow illegal because it violates provisions 
of the Park City General Plan. But the General Plan is not a law, statute, or ordinance and, 
even if it were, the Ordinance does not contravene its provisions. 
Plaintiffs carry the burden of proving illegality by showing the Ordinance violates a 
law, statute, or ordinance. The General Plan is a "guiding document" and a "long range 
policy plan.''41 Whereas the LMC is "lawt the General Plan is merely "policy."42 And the 
LMC's reference to the General Plan as a guiding document does not ordain it with the 
force of law. By stating as one of its "purposes" that lot line adjustments are to be made "in 
accordance ,vith the General Plan," the LMC, if anything, imposes a procedural 
requirement.43 And even if construed as a procedural requirement, that requirement was 
met, as the City found that the Ordinance was consistent with the General Plan.44 That 
finding is undisputed for purposes of this appeal.45 
40 id. § 15-7-2(A). 
41 General Plan, at 8. 
tl2 Id. 
,13 LMC § 15-7-1. 
,1t1 See R. 118-19, 145--47 




Further, no part of the language Plaintiffs quote precludes the conversion of three 
metes a~d bounds parcels into a single lot of record. The Ordinance did not alter the zoning 
to allow for a commercial purpose and, while the combination of the parcels increased the 
@ 
allowed density, this aggregation conformed to the density allowed in the zone. 
Plaintiffs' arguments as to the density that was eventually allowed to be constructed 
@ on the lot as a result of the City approving the CUP application are unpersuasive. Plaintiffs 
make much of the "transitioning in scale" language found in the General Plan and argue 
that "[t]he Ordinance is in violation with the General Plan because it grants the Applicant 
the right to develop the property literally to the maximum scale allowed in the RC zone."46 
But the Ordinance did not deal with the construction of any certain building on the lot. The 
density allowed on the lot was set by a separate floor area ratio determined by the LMC. 
The process that detem1ined the density that would actually be allowed to be constructed on 
the lot ,vas the CUP application. As has been discussed previously, Plaintiffs raised these 
@ arguments in the context of the CUP application and the litigation that stemmed therefrom, 
and chose not to appeal the determination reached by the district court. 
The General Plan is exactly that, a general plan guiding the future development of 
Park City. The Ordinance is not, and cannot, be rendered illegal by its general guiding 
principles. 
46 Brief of Appellants, nt 14 ( emphasis in original). 
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III. PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO ADDRESS THE PREJUDICE PRONG BELOW 
AND CANNOT REMEDY THAT FAILURE WITH NEW ARGUMENTS 
RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
The Utah Supreme Court has instructed that in addition to proving illegality, 
Plaintiffs "must establish that they were prejudiced by the City's noncompliance with its 
ordinances or, in other words, how, if at all, the City's decision would have been different 
and what relief, if any, they are entitled to as a result."47 Plaintiffs ignored the prejudice 
requirement below. Recognizing the error in this approach, they rationalize their failure to 
preserve this argument before the district court. But the Court should reject this post hoc 
attempt to introduce arguments not raised below. 
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the [ district] court may not be raised on 
appeal. "48 "An issue is preserved for appeal vlhen it has been presented to the district court 
in such a way that the court has an opportunity to rule on [it]."49 "In determining whether 
the district court had an opportunity to rule on an issue, a court considers three factors: 
47 Springville Citizens for a Better C,nty. v. City of Springville, 1999 UT 25, ~ 31, 979 
P.2d 332; see also Suarez v. Grand Cnty., 2012 UT 72, ~ 57,296 P.3d 688 ("For us to set 
aside Ordinance 454 due to illegality, ,ve must first determine that the ordinance does not 
comply with the terms and standards of applicable zoning ordinances already in place. 
Second, Citizens must establish that they ,vere prejudiced by the [County's] non-
compliance with its ordinances or, in other words, how, if at all, the [County's) decision 
,vould have been different and ,vhat relief: if any, they arc entitled to as a result." 
( citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
48 State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ii 1 l, 10 P.3d 346. 
49 Id. ii 12 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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'(1) whether the issue was raised in a timely fashion, (2) whether the issue was specifically 
raised, and (3) whether supporting evidence or relevant authority was introduced. "'so 
It is undisputed that the first element is not met because Plaintiffs did not raise or 
even acknowledge the requirement that they demonstrate prejudice below. Plaintiffs first 
addressed this argument in their opening brief in this appeal. The second element is not met 
@ because Plaintiffs did not raise the specific issue of prejudice. Plaintiffs appear to argue that 
they nevertheless preserved their prejudice arguments because they "have argued from the 
beginning that had the City Council appropriately followed its LMC and General Plan, the 
lot line consolidation would have been granted with the stipulation that the square footage 
of the development confonn to the pre-Ordinance square footage, around 9,000 sq. ft."51 
But Plaintiffs provide no record citations to support their statement that they made this 
argument from the beginning. As to the third element, it is undisputed that Plaintiffs did not 
provide the district court ,:vith any supp011ing evidence or relevant authority from which it 
Ci could have dete1mined that Plaintiffs ,vere prejudiced. 
On balance, a revie,:v of these factors demonstrates that Plaintiffs did not sufficiently 
address the prejudice argument below such that the district court had an opportunity to rule 
on it. Therefore, Plaintiffs failed to preserve this issue for appeal. 
50 Ff/inward v. State, 2012 UT 85, ~I 9, 293 P .3d 259 (quoting Warne v. Warne, 2012 UT 
13, il 16, 275 P.3d 238). 
s1 Brief of Appellants~ at 15. 
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CONCLUSION 
Over six years ago, Valley of Love applied through a minor subdivision proceeding 
to have its three parcels recognized as a single lot of record. The City Council approved 
that application. Since that time, the parties have repeated and re-addressed the same 
arguments in two separate proceedings. The Court should give finality to the district court's 
ruling on these issues in the CUP proceeding by recognizing that mling's preclusive effect 
on this appeal. But even if the Court is persuaded to once more address these issues on the 
merits, it should affinn the ruling of the district comi because the Ordinance is legal and 
Plaintiffs failed to preserve or establish prejudice. 
DATED this 28th day of August, 2015. 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH, PC 
Justin J. Keys 
Attorneys/or Defendant Valley of Love, LLC 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
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DAVID OLSEN, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PARK CITY MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATION, et al., 
Defendants. 
RULING AND ORDER 
Case No. 110500209 
Judge Todd Shaughnessy 
This is an appeal from Park City Municipal Corporation's ("Park City's") approval 
of a Conditional Use Permit ("CUP") for property located at 1440 Empire Avenue, Park 
City, Utah. The parties filed with the court the record of the proceedings before Park 
City, and presented the merits of their appeal by cross-motions for sur:nmary judgment.1 
The motions were fully briefed and oral argument was held on April 2, 2013. Plaintiffs 
were represented by Bruce Baird. Defendant Park City was represented by Polly 
Samuels-McLean. Defendant Valley of Love, LLC was represented by Erle Lee. 
Following the hearing, the court took the matter under advisement. Having reviewed the 
record, the papers flied in support of and in opposition to the motion for summary 
@ judgment, and being fully advised, the court now rules on the motions as follows. 
In reviewing Park City's decision to grant the Conditional Use Permit, this court 
11must presume that [Park City's] ... decision ... is valid .... " Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-
The Issues were presented in this fashion by sttpulatlon of the parties. Therefore, any procedural 
Irregularity arising out of having the Issues presented by summary Judgment motion Is waived. 
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802{3)(a)(i). This court's review Is limited to determining whether Park City's decision 
was 11arbltrary, capricious, or illegal." Id. § 10-9a-802(3)(a)(li); see also Id. § 10-9a-
802{3)(c) f'A final decision of a land use authority or an appeal authority is valid If the 
decision is supported by substantial evidence In the record and Is not arbitrary, 
capricious, or Illegal."). In this case, plalntlffs expllcltly dlsclalm any challenge to Park 
City's factual findings, and likewise dlsclalm any argument that Park City's decision was 
arbitrary or capricious. See, e.g., Pl. Combined Reply Mem. at 4.2 One consequence of 
I 
this approach Is that the court must accept as true all of the factual findings that are 
contained in Park City's February 1 O, 2011, final written decision. 
Plaintiffs are therefore left only with the argument that Park Clty1s decision to grant 
the CUP was Illegal. "A determination of illegality requires a determination that the 
decision . . . violates a law, statute, or ordinance In effect at the time the decision was 
made .... " Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-802(3)(d). Plaintiffs argue that Park City1s grant of 
the CUP violates various provisions of Park City's Land Management Code ("LMC") and 
Park City's General Plan. Plaintiffs do not Identify any statute or other law, beyond Park 
City's own land use and municipal ordlnances 1 that serves as the basis for Its Illegality 
challenge. This court must "review a local agency's Interpretation of an ordinance for 
correctness, but also afford some level of non-binding deference to the interp·retation 
advanced by the local agency." Carrier v. Saft Lake County, 2004 UT 98, '128; see also 
Fox v. Park City, 2008 UT 85, ,r 11 ("Because a determination of Illegality Is based on a 
land use authority's interpretation of zoning ordinances, we review such determinations 
for correctness, but we also afford some level of non~blndlng deference to the 
Interpretation advanced by the land use authority." (inte~nal quotations omitted)). Finally, 
even if plaintiffs show Illegality, they also must establlsh that they were prejudiced by that 
2 In the briefs and during oral argument counsel for plaintiffs candidly acknowledged that plaintiffs had 
not met (or even attempted to meet) the marshalling requirement necessary to mount such a challenge, and 
also acknowledged the Inherent difficulty of undertaking such a task, 
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illegality - I.e .• plaintiffs must show "how, If at all, [Park} City's decision would have been 
different and what relief, If any, they are entitled to as a result. 11 Sprlngv/1/e Citizens for a 
Better Community v. City of Sprlngvl/le, 1999 UT 25, ,r 31.3 
Plaintiffs make three general arguments in an attempt to show that Park City's 
decision to grant the CUP was illegal. Each is addressed below. 
Plaintiffs first argue that Park City's decision is illegal because It affords the 
property greater density or development rights than would be available for the combined 
total of the three lots that comprise the property. In other words, plaintiffs argue that the 
density or development rights available for the property cannot, under any 
circumstances, exceed the sum of the density rights that would be available if each of 
the three lots were developed separately and the rights associated with those three lots 
were combined Into one. Plaintiffs do not .cite any provision of the LMC that explicitly 
prohibits the aggregation of density or development rights. Instead, plaintiffs cite three 
provisions of the LMC that address lot line adjustments (LMC §§ 15-7.1-7(E)(1)(a) 
(repealed), 15-7-3{A), 15-7-2),4 one which states that the 11provislons of these regulations 
shall be held to be the mlnlmum requirements for the promotion of public health, safety 
and general welfare 11 (LMC § 15-7-5(A)), one which references general purposes of land 
use restrictions (LMC § 15-7-2(G)), and one which states that- 11[w]here any provision of 
these regulations imposes restrictions different from those Imposed by any other 
provision of these regulations or any other ordinance, rule or regulation or other provision 
of law, whichever provisions are more restrictive or impose higher standards shall 
3 In Gardner v. Perry City, 2000 UT App, 11 ~ 20 n.7, the Utah Court of Appeals criticized the prejudice 
requirement as "impos{lng] a difficult- If not Impossible - burden on a citizen who seeks to challenge the 
procedural legallty of a city's land use decision." And the Utah Supreme Court, In Suarez v. Grand County, 
2012 UT 72, ~ 57 n.85, acknowledged that criticism but declined to address the validity of the requirement in 
that case. It therefore remains good law. Ultlmately, however, the result In this case does not turn on 
whether plaintiffs have shown prejudice so as far as this case Is concerned, the Issue Is academic. 
One of these, LMC § 15-7-2(C ), states that one of the purposes of these ordinances ls to "prevent 
overcrowding of the land and undue congestion of the population." This Is the closest plaintiffs come to 
citing anything that seems lo have any plausible applicability to the argument they make. 
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control." (LMC § 15-7-5(8)(1)). Plaintiffs do not connect their aggreg~tlon theory to any 
of these ordinances, and do not demonstrate that Park City's decision to grant the CUP 
vlolates any of them, Perhaps more important, as Park City points out In Its re.sponse: 
First, permitted density Is not determined In the manner articulated in plaintiffs' briefs; 
rather, density is determined by making a Floor Area Ratio calculation pursuant to a 
formula dictated by the LMC; the LMC prohibits a Floor Area Ratio In excess of 1.0; and 
ft Is undisputed that the Floor Area Ratio for this project is .999, less than the 1.0 
maximum permitted under the LMC, Second, the three lots here were combined Into 
one lot In a separate subdivision proceeding before the City. In that proceeding, plaintiffs 
lodged an objection, appealed to the district court, and that matter currently is on appeal 
to the Utah Court of Appeals. It Is this subdivision proceeding, not the CUP proceeding, 
that established the basis for making the calculations for the Floor Area Ratio and 
therefore resulted in the development rights about which plaintiffs now complain. 
Therefore, any objections were or should have been raised In subdivision proceeding, 
For all of these reasons, plaintiffs' aggregation argument falls as a matter of law. 
Plaintiffs' second argument Is that the City violated the LMC because it failed to 
review each of the factors the LMC requires it to review before granting a CUP. 
Specifically, plaintiffs argue that mid~way through the approval process the developer 
submitted a "new design" and that new design was not subjected to a full review for each 
of the fifteen criteria necessary to grant a CUP. Park City disputes plaintiffs' 
characterization of the revisions made to the plans; while the city admits the building 
plans were new and different from the plans that had been partially approved by the City, 
they do not constitute a '1new design". This is a fact question and because plaintiffs 
elected not to marshal the evidence, the court must accept Park City's position that the 
revisions were not a "new design". Even more basic than this, however, Park City's 
written findings of fact - which this court must accept as true - expressly address each 
of the fifteen criteria required by the ordinance as applled to the "new design". Plaintiffs 
@ 
@ 
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failure to challenge these findings Is fatal to their argument regarding the City's alleged 
failure to properly review the design. 
Plaintiffs' third and final argument Is that the granting of the CUP Is not consistent 
with the City's General Plan. The General Plan Is, as Its name suggests, a broad outline 
used for land use planning across the entire city. It contains, among other things, an 
exhibit that is zoning map that shows the various zoning designations. It Is undisputed 
that the property at Issue Is located In the "RC11 or Recreation Commercial District. Since 
the adoption of the General Plan, construction on the East side of Empire Avenue has 
consisted exclusively of single family homes. Allowed uses within the RC zone Include 
bed and breakfast Inns, boarding houses, hostels, hotels or motels with fewer than 16 
rooms, etc. Thus, the multi-unit dwelling Is a permitted use within the RC designation. 
Plaintiffs argue that because the land use map Identifies the area as "Low Density 
Residential" and the General Plan suggests the area should serve as a transition 
between the commercial area associated with the Park City Mountain Resort on one side 
and the lower density residential area on the other. The development of a multi-unit 
dwelling of the type contemplated here would not, according to plaintiffs, be consistent 
with a "Low Density Residential" designation or a transition from commercial to 
residential zones. 
There are a number of problems with this argument. To begin, the zoning map 
upon which plaintiffs' argument hinges explicitly states that it is for "illustrative purposes 
only" undermining the weight that can be attached to the map and its application to a 
specific parcel of property. Second, the court has serious doubt about whether a 
General Plan, or a zoning map contained in a General Plan, rises to the level of a 11law, 
statute, or ordinance" upon which a finding of Illegality could be made. Plaintiffs provide 
no authority suggesting that a General Plan or zoning map, standing alone, has the force 
of an ordinance and this court has serious reseivations about whether broad planning 
documents of this type could properly serve as the basis for a finding of illegality. 
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PlainUffs seem to acknowledge this problem, and attempt to address it by citing to LMC § 
15-1-1 O(D) which states, In part, that "ft]he City shall not issue a Conditional Use Permit 
unless the Planning Commission concludes that ... the Use Is consistent with the Park 
City General Plan, as amended .... " LMC § 15-1-10(0) does not, however, elevate the 
General Plan (or a zoning map) to the status of an ordinance; rather, It requires the 
decision making body to examine the proposed use and determine whether that use Is 
. consistent with the General Plan, Park City's final written decision does this, by stating 
11(t]he Use is consistent with the Park City General Plan, as amended." (R. 00003). At a 
minimum, the determination of whether a conditional use should be permitted on a 
particular parcel of property In light of a munlclpallty's general plan Is one where "some 
level of non-binding deference to the Interpretation advanced by the local agency" is 
warranted. For all of these reasons, plaintiffs' general plan arguments likewise fail as a 
matter of law. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing, and for good cause appearing, plaintiffs' motion for 
summary judgment is DENIED; Park City's cross-motion for summary judgment Is 
GRANrED; and the Park City Council's final decision dated February 1 0, 2011 is 
AFFIRMED.5 This is the final order, and no other order is required. 
DATED this 10th day of May, 2013. 
5 The developer of the property, defendant Valloy of Love, LLC, Joined in the cross-motion for 
summary Judgment filed by Park City, 
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